comunicato Mario Ciancarella su dichiarazioni Cossiga

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COSSIGA E USTICA: L’IGNOBILTA’ REGNA SOVRANA

Un giorno ebbi a scrivere a Cossiga, al tempo fondatore dell’Udeur che poi sarebbe stata affidata alla “mani abili” di Mastella, che egli “sedeva nel nostro Parlamento con la stessa dignita’ con cui Pinochet sedeva nel Congresso Cileno”.

Dopo le dichiarazioni recenti del senatore sulla vicenda Ustica, quel concetto va corretto certamente, ed a favore di Pinochet, ahinoi!

Appare ignobile ed insopportabile infatti la metodica del “ricatto politico” utilizzata dal senatore Cossiga il quale, pur di cercare un accredito - fino ad oggi negato - di servitore fedelissimo di interessi di altre sovranita’, non esita a disegnare a tinte fosche la dignita’ delle nostre Istituzioni Nazionali.

Dunque uomini dei nostri servizi (chi, in quale occasione e circostanza? Non viene detto, come sempre, per “salvaguardare la riservatezza degli stesi servizi”, naturalmente) avrebbero rilevato al nostro Presidente della Repubblica ed al primo Ministro Amato, dunque trail 1992 ed il 1994, che i responsabili dell’abbattimento dell’IH870 sarebbero stati i francesi.

Ora bisognerebbe capire, e chiederlo al senatore al fine di questa comprensione necessaria, come sia possibile che le massime cariche dello Stato, se messe a conoscenza di una simile circostanza, abbiano potuto sottacerla al Paese, al suo Parlamento ed alle sue Istituzioni Giudiziarie evitando che se ne potesse chiedere conto ai presunti responsabili con la forza e la determinazione che una simile conoscenza avrebbe dovuto determinare.

Non solo. Essendo al tempo in piena attivita’ la azione investigativa del giudice Priore c’e’ da chiedersi se questa circostanza omissiva non concretizzi, essa si’, una attivita’ di Alto Tradimento, unica ipotesi in cui sia possibile incriminare anche il Capo dello Stato per le attivita’ poste in essere durante il proprio mandato.

Cosi’ come c’e’ da chiedersi come sia possibile assistere alla inerzia dei responsabili attuali delle piu’ alte Magistrature della Repubblica a fronte delle odierne ignobili esternazioni del nostro senatore, gia’ presidente di questa Repubblica. L’indignata domanda del senatore Manca, gia’ autorevole membro della cd Commissione Stragi, sul perche’ allora il senatore Cossiga abbia taciuto simili circostanze alla Commissione, e’ solo un piccolo espediente per definirsi “imbrogliati” piuttosto che “improvvidi ed impreparati” (specie per chi ha recentemente scritto addirittura un libro a sostegno della ipotesi bomba) e per non trarre comunque dalla odierna indignazione delle immediate conseguenze di denuncia agli organi di garanzia della legittimita’ legale e costituzionale di questo Paese.

Se le affermazioni del senatore Cossiga avessero infatti una qualche pur minima parvenza di verita’ sostanziale, essi tutti – dal Capo dello Stato, al Capo del Governo, dalla Magistratura Inquirente a quella Costituzionale, fino alla Presidenza delle due Camere – avrebbero l’obbligo di insorgere non solo contro la dinamica oggi denunciata dal senatore e di chiederne conto, in tutte le forme legittime ed in tutte le sedi deputate, ai presunti responsabili, ma avrebbero anche e contestualmente l’obbligo di agire contro l’omertoso silenzio mantenuto negli anni dal senatore Cossiga, dall’on. Amato e da quanti abbiano omesso (secondo la aneddotica cossighiana) di rendere nota e di pubblico dominio una circostanza di simile gravita’.

Se invece le circostanze denunciate fossero destituite di ogni fondamento non sarebbe possibile sottrarsi quantomeno all’obbligo di certificazione di “demenza senile” per il senatore, anche al solo fine, quantomeno, di sottrarlo ad altre e ben piu’ pesanti responsabilita’.

La ben piu’ triste e drammatica realta’ e’ che il primo e diretto responsabile della organizzazione e della disposizione esecutiva per Ustica (per quanto egli ed i responsabili politici possano essere stati tratti in inganno dagli apparati sulla reale dinamica che sarebbe stata poi realizzata) e’ stato proprio il senatore Cossiga, per facilitare una aspettativa statunitense, non diversamente realizzabile direttamente dagli apparati americani, per una serie molto ben documentabile di circostanze politico diplomatiche.

Il senatore Cossiga vive lacerato dal rimorso, forse, e certamente dalla triste constatazione di non aver saputo o potuto ottenere da quell’estremo atto di servilismo atlantico nessun riconoscimento ufficiale. Certamente anche in virtu’ del concreto esito fallimentare di una azione coperta che avrebbe potuto destabilizzare una larga parte dell’Occidente lungo il corso di tutti questi ventotto anni di menzogne e ritrosie. E questo lo tormenta profondamente, proprio perche’ nonostante i suoi ridicoli tentativi di accreditarsi come “uomo di strutture militari o paramilitari” (senza mai aver svolto alcuna attivita’ militare propria e pur essendosi autoproclamato prima – da sottosegretario – Capitano, e poi – da Presidente del Consiglio – Colonnello, in relata’ Capitano di fregata della Marina), il senatore non ha la stoffa e la cultura per accettare di svolgere in assoluto anonimato incarichi da cui non sia possibile trarre alcuna gratificazione concreta e pubblicamente registrabile, e per i quali sia necessario accontentarsi della sola consapevolezza di “aver fatto la cosa giusta”.

E’ una angustia da sempre dissimulata, che il senatore ha cercato di superare con rivelazioni, sempre parziali e sempre autoreferenziali, della sua improbabile partecipazione alla preparazione delle reazioni politico-militari alla conquista del potere legittimo da parte di formazioni politiche del comunismo; con una apparente “modestia” sui propri ruoli nei progetti di controllo militare della nostra sovranita’ nazionale e con la costante chiamata in correita’ e responsabilita’ di chi sapeva sarebbe stato costretto a tenergli il sacco per non disgelare la propria ignobilta’ istituzionale se fossero state approfonditi gli scenari che volta a volta il senatore andava prospettando.

Ma sono tutti tenativi destinati a lasciarlo con la frustrazione deprimente del proprio fallimento umano e di uomo delle Istituzioni.

L’invito al senatore non puo’ allora che essere quello di dire, alla fine e prima della sua fine, la sola ed unica verita’ possibile: quella di essere stato cioe’ l’organizzatore e l’artefice primo della scellerata strage di Ustica, ne’ piu’ ne’ meno di come il dittatore Pinochet abbia rivendicato la sua attivita’ golpista e le drammatiche violenze contro i civili che la hanno accompagnata, per “salvare il popolo cileno dal comunismo incombente a causa di Allende”.

Ne trarrebbe certamente una maggiore dignita’ rispetto a questi miserevoli tentativi di attribuire a altri, che pure gli sono stati complici collaterali quanto fondamentali (come i Francesi) nel raffinato progetto stragista di Ustica, responsabilita’ dirette che egli sa di avere esclusivamente in prima persona e di condividere con i piu’ alti vertici politico e militari che al tempo e successivamente si resero complici della sua realizzazione e della sua dissimulazione depistante.

La finisca il senatore di inventare piccole e ripetute balle su presunti quanto improbabili responsabili diretti dell’abbattimento di quell’aereo civile, di fare affermazioni che rendono sempre piu’ ignobile la natura dei poteri politici di questo nostro sfortunato Paese, ed assuma finalmente il coraggio e la responsabilita’ di alzarsi davanti al Popolo italiano e dichiararsi il principale artefice di quell’atto scellerato e sanguinario, ma che sarebbe un po’ meno ignobile se finalmente avessimo piena conoscenza dei (non imperscrutabili) retroscena e dei necessari responsabili istituzionali che lo resero possibile.

Mario Ciancarella

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Ci sono degli errori nel comunicato di Mario Ciancarella che per correttezza secondo me vanno segnalati.
Il primo è che Cossiga nelle sue dichiarazioni di due giorni fa parla di Amato
quando era sottosegretario alla presidenza del consiglio,
non di quando Amato era presidente del Consiglio.
La presidenza della Repubblica di Cossiga va dal 1985 al 1992.
Sottosegretario alla Presidenza del Consiglio l'onorevole Amato è stato durante la presidenza Cossiga
dal 1985 al 1987. Ci dispiace che il senatore a vita non abbia detto queste cose allora,
erano vivi Marcucci, Dettori,i piloti Naldini e Nutarelli, i due testimoni di Marcucci.
Avremmo (come singoli e come popolo) voluto sentire il loro parere, magari se non fossero stati uccisi
(sempre secondo noi) uno dopo l'altro in questi ventuno anni
tutti avrebbero avuto molto da dire su quanto sostenuto solo oggi dal senatore Cossiga,
magari queste persone per noi uccise, se vive avrebbero aiutato i magistrati
a risolvere il caso Ustica e non ci sarebbe più bisogno di parlarne, perchè le vittime
avrebbero avuto Verità e Giustizia.
L’ultimo errore riscontrato da noi nel comunicato di Mario Ciancarella
è che il senatore Manca non domanda a Cossiga perchè non ha detto quanto sostiene oggi
alla Commissione Stragi, ma quando fu interrogato all’udienza di
primo grado contro Tascio, Bartolucci,Ferri e Melillo in Corte d’Assise a Roma.
Questi errori non cambiano la sostanza di quello Mario Ciancarella scrive, siamo pienamente
d’accordo con lui. Cordialmente,
Laura Picchi

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http://www.politicaonline.net/forum/showthread.php?t=407995&page=1

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12 - COSSIGA: FURONO I FRANCESI A LANCIARE IL MISSILE A USTICA…
(Agi) - "Furono i nostri servizi segreti che, quando io ero Presidente della Repubblica, informarono l’allora Sottosegretario Giuliano Amato e me che erano stati i francesi, con un aereo della Marina, a lanciare un missile non ad impatto, ma a risonanza. Se fosse stato ad impatto non ci sarebbe nulla dell’aereo". Lo ha detto il Presidente emerito della Repubblica Francesco Cossiga a Sky Tg24 a proposito del missile che abbatte’ l’aereo dell’Itavia sulle acque di Ustica.
"La tesi - prosegue il Presidente Emerito della Repubblica - e’ che i francesi sapevano che sarebbe passato l’aereo di Gheddafi. La verita’ e’ che Gheddafi si salvo’ perche’ il Sismi, il generale Santovito, appresa l’informazione, lo informo’ quando lui era appena decollato e decise di tornare indietro. I francesi questo lo sapevano - conclude Cossiga - videro un aereo dall’altra parte di quello italiano e si nascose dietro per non farsi prendere dal radar".

Ustica, generale Manca: perché Cossiga non ha parlato prima?
Prime reazioni alle parole di Francesco Cossiga, che ha dichiarato la paternità francese del missile che ha colpito l'aereo Itavia in volo tra Bologna e Ustica il 27 giugno 1980. A parlare è il generale Vincenzo Manza, ex senatore di Forza Italia e vicepresidente della commissione Stragi, che afferma: «Perché il senatore Cossiga non ha riferito la notizia diffusa oggi quando fu chiamato come teste alla Corte di Assise di Roma nel processo su Ustica?». Francesco Cossiga, all'epoca dei fatti, era Presidente del Consiglio. Continua Manca: «Quanto affermato dal Presidente emerito della Repubblica Cossiga inquieta moltissimo e propone domande alle quali la stessa personalità politica dovrebbe rispondere». E ancora: «Gli italiani attendono risposte a queste domande e si augurano di avere prove relative al fatto che un presidente emerito della Repubblica abbia pensato bene prima di fare certe affermazioni, ben sapendo che è così che nascono i processi di piazza e non quelli previsti da uno Stato di diritto, i quali hanno già espresso abbondantemente il loro parere». Infine si domanda: «Perché l'onorevole Giuliano Amato, Presidente del Consiglio nella XIII legislatura non riferì a me e al senatore Pellegrino recatici a palazzo Chigi per sollecitargli l'interessamento del Presidente Clinton, del presidente Chirac e del presidente Gheddafi a pronunciarsi sul caso Ustica, non fece alcun cenno a quanto già riferitogli a suo tempo dal generale Santovito ed ora reso pubblico dal senatore Cossiga?».

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Cossiga: «I francesi provocarono la strage di Ustica»
Carlo Lania
Roma

«Quando ero presidente della Repubblica i nostri servizi segreti mi informarono che a provocare la strage di Ustica furono i francesi». Parola di Francesco Cossiga che ventotto anni dopo l'abbattimento del Dc9 Itavia decide improvvisamente di svelare un altro tassello sulla tragedia che la sera del 20 giugno 1980 costò la vita a 81 persone tra passeggeri e membri dell'equipaggio. In un'intervista rilasciata ieri a SkyTg24, Cossiga spiega infatti di aver saputo delle presunte responsabilità di Parigi dal Sismi, che avrebbe informato anche Giuliano Amato, all'epoca sottosegretario alla presidenza del consiglio del governo Craxi. Circostanza questa che, se confermata, collocherebbe la rivelazione tra l'85 e l'87. «Furono i nostri servizi segreti - ha detto ieri Cossiga - che quando io ero presidente della Repubblica informarono l'allora sottosegretario Giuliano Amato e me che erano stati i francesi, con un aereo della Marina, a lanciare un missile non a impatto, ma a risonanza. Se fosse stato a impatto non ci sarebbe nulla dell'aereo».
Non è la prima volta che l'ex presidente della Repubblica tira in ballo i francesi. Analoghe dichiarazioni, infatti, Cossiga le rilasciò nel gennaio dello scorso anno alla trasmissione radiofonica Baobab. Del tutto inediti, invece, sono i riferimenti al Sismi e al generale Santovito, che guidò il servizio dal 1977 al 1981. «La tesi - ha spiegato ieri Cossiga - è che i francesi sapevano che sarebbe passato l'aereo di Gheddafi. La verità è che Gheddafi si salvò perché il Sismi, il generale Santovito, appresa l'informazione, lo informò quando lui era appena decollato e decise di tornare indietro. I francesi questo lo sapevano - ha concluso Cossiga - videro un aereo dall'altra parte di quello italiano e si nascose dietro per non farsi prendere dai radar».
Nessun commento da parte del ministro degli Interni Amato alle parole di Cossiga che lo coinvolgono. Ma le affermazioni dell'ex presidente della Repubblica vengono giudicate di estremo interesse da coloro che per anni hanno lavorato per scoprire quanto accadde sui cieli di Ustica. «Le conclusioni di Cossiga sono le stesse alle quali sono arrivato anch'io con la mia inchiesta», spiega Rosario Priore, giudice istruttore nell'inchiesta sulla strage. «Credo che le sue informazioni sia attendibili, anche se le sue fonti sono diverse dalle mie. Io non ho potuto dare una nazionalità all'aereo militare, anche se poteva essere solo statunitense o francese». Nel corso della sua inchiesta Priore si recò anche negli Usa: «La Nato disse che quella sera c'era un forte movimento aereo, che rendeva possibile la presenza di una portaerei. Anche in questo caso le possibilità non erano molte: o la Clemenceau, che però i francesi dissero che si trovava in porto a Tolone, o l'americana Saratoga, a Napoli». Plausibile anche l'ipotesi di un Sismi che allerta Gheddafi: «E' una teoria che circolava fin dall'inizio - conferma infatti Priore -. C'era una frattura nel Sismi: una parte filo-araba guidata da Santovito e un'altra più filo-israeliana».
D'accordo nel non sottovalutare le dichiarazioni di Cossiga anche l'avvocato Alessandro Gamberini, legale dei familiari delle vittime di Ustica. «Si sa che quella notte un aereo, giunto all'altezza di Malta tornò indietro. Quelle di Cossiga sono informazioni che vanno coltivate, anche perché la Francia è l'unico paese a non aver risposto alle rogatorie in modo compiuto». «Esterrefatta» per le parole di Cossiga si dice infine Daria Bonfietti, presidente dell'Associazione familiari vittime di Ustica. «Quando è stato interrogato dalla corte di Assise che processava i generali, Cossiga non ha detto nulla, adesso invece parla. Bene, mi auguro che vista l'importanza delle sue affermazioni il governo decida di verificare se quanto dice è vero oppure no».

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La strage di Ustica e il singolare comportamento di Cossiga [pagg. 154-55]:

La sentenza-ordinanza del giudice Priore non mancherà di evidenziare la singolarità dei comportamenti di Cossiga rispetto alla strage di Ustica: "Se l'attività del presidente del Consiglio Cossiga è stata pressoché nulla nel periodo immediatamente successivo [alla strage], altrettanto non si può dire del periodo in cui egli ha rivestito l'incarico di capo dello Stato". Intatti, appena eletto presidente della Repubblica, nel luglio 1985, Cossiga ingaggiò subito come suo consigliere militare il generale dell'Aeronautica Stelio Nardini, un alto ufficiale "molto capace e attento... che mi pilotava in questa materia", cioè sulle vicende di Ustica, alle quali il capo dello Stato sembrava particolarmente interessato. L'inchiesta sulla strage proseguiva a fatica, fra mille difficoltà e depistaggi. Dalla sua posizione privilegiata al Quirinale, il generale Nardini seguì molto da vicino tutti gli sviluppi connessi a quella sciagura aerea. Per esempio, ricevette copia dell'appunto redatto dal generale Mario Arpino, il 30 settembre 1986, relativo al colloquio che questi aveva avuto - insieme ai generali Zeno Tascio e Creste Gargioli - con il sottosegretario alla presidenza del Consiglio Giuliano Amato sulle cause della strage, dovendo il sottosegretario rispondere ad alcune interrogazioni parlamentari. Ai primi di agosto 1986, dopo aver ricevuto un appello del "Comitato per la verità su Ustica" (presieduto dal senatore Francesco Paolo Bonifacio) "affinché fosse posta fine a un silenzio intollerabile", il capo dello Stato Cossiga inviò una lettera al presidente del Consiglio Craxi sollecitando adeguati interventi e notando - fra l'altro - che emergeva "un quadro fin troppo chiuso delle oggettive difficoltà incontrate nell'inchiesta, ma anche del malessere che la disinformazione ha alimentato non solo nella pubblica opinione nazionale, ma anche negli ambienti comunitari". In pratica -come rileverà il giudice Priore - nell'immediatezza della strage il presidente del Consiglio Cossiga era rimasto del tutto inattivo, mentre sei anni dopo, da capo dello Stato, sollecitava al presidente del Consiglio Craxi "adeguati interventi".

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http://files.filefront.com/sed0524pdf/;9694022;/fileinfo.html

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The Italian Communists and the Us
By Richard N. Gardner, Reply by Adrian Lyttelton
In response to Italia Nostra (March 9, 2006)

To the Editors:

In his thoughtful and generous review of my book Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War [NYR, March 9] Adrian Lyttelton raises a number of important historical issues on which I would like to comment.

To begin with, Professor Lyttelton believes my book does less than justice to the Western evolution of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) between 1975 and 1979. He correctly recalls Enrico Berlinguer's occasional criticisms of the Soviet Union and Berlinguer's support for Italian membership in NATO. But as is documented in my book, Berlinguer and other PCI leaders during my years in Rome consistently affirmed their fidelity to Marxism-Leninism, praised the achievements of the Soviet Revolution of 1917, and advocated foreign policies favoring Soviet aims and threatening Western interests. They even joined the Soviet propaganda campaign insinuating that the United States was behind the Red Brigades and the murder of Aldo Moro. The PCI also sought to close or severely limit the use of US naval and air bases in Italy and opposed NATO-recommended budget increases for the Italian armed forces.

Perhaps most importantly, the PCI opposed the stationing of cruise missiles in Italy in 1979, which was an essential part of NATO's decision to deploy Theatre Nuclear Forces to counterbalance the Soviet nuclear buildup threatening Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev declared in his memoirs that the TNF deployment was critical in convincing him to end the arms race and terminate the cold war. Had the PCI entered the Italian government, an outcome Professor Lyttelton suggests I should have encouraged, Italy's cruise missile deployment would never have occurred.

Professor Lyttelton appears to agree with those Italians who felt "it would have been more important to strengthen the Italian political system by internal reform than to keep the PCI out of power." But the PCI opposed most of the reforms Italy urgently needed in the late 1970s, such as privatization of its inefficient state enterprises and reform of its rigid labor laws, its inflationary wage indexation system, and its overly generous pensions. When Fiat decided in 1980 to dismiss workers responsible for violence and absenteeism in its factories, Berlinguer stood in front of Fiat's Mirafiori plant and encouraged the workers to occupy the factory.

Professor Lyttelton doubts that the US statement of January 12, 1978, confirming our opposition to Communist participation in the Italian government had "a decisive influence" on the Italian political situation. He points out that the day before the statement the Christian Democrats (DC) had already decided to include the PCI only in the parliamentary majority, without Cabinet posts. But I had been recalled to Washington several days before the DC meeting and Italian political leaders well understood that a US statement of concern about the growth of Communist influence would be forthcoming. Moreover, it was by no means certain that the DC decision to bring the PCI into the parliamentary majority was the last step in the PCI advance to power. Many saw it as a transitional step to their subsequent entry into the government with important ministerial positions. Two months later when Aldo Moro was kidnapped by the Red Brigades, Berlinguer demanded his party's inclusion in a "government of democratic unity," and the Rome correspondent of The New York Times reported new "pressure on the Christian Democrats to bring the Communists into a national emergency government." History never discloses its alternatives, but without our statement of January 12, the Moro crisis could well have produced a coalition government with the Communists.

As Professor Lyttelton explains, President Carter, even before I arrived in Rome, approved a policy that expressed a clear preference for a non-Communist government in Italy, combined with a commitment to respect the free choice of the Italian people, to open communications with the PCI, and to terminate the covert CIA financing of political leaders and other activities that had provoked widespread resentment against the US. The January 12 statement was necessary because Italians on the left and right were either misrepresenting or misinterpreting our policy as one of acquiescence to Communist entry into the government. When no less a figure than DC leader Amintore Fanfani told me in December 1977 of his plan to become prime minister in a government with the Communists, I became convinced of the need to clarify the US position. I did not want Fanfani or any other Italian leader to say in future years that US ambiguity on Communist entry had encouraged him to take a step with such important implications for Western security and Italian democracy.

Finally, Professor Lyttelton raises the legitimate question of whether the US statement constituted improper interference in the domestic affairs of an Allied country. We did not think so, and I believe for good reason. The presidential decision memorandum of February 1977 stated that "we will not interfere in Italy's domestic affairs by such actions as dictating to the Italians how they should vote, seeking to manipulate political events in Italy, or financing political parties and personalities." At the same time, the memorandum added that "we should find an early opportunity to make public" our clear preference that our Allies be governed by non-Communist political parties.

It was axiomatic that Italy as a sovereign country was free to choose whatever government it wished. But the United States, also as a sovereign country, had the right to express an opinion as to the kind of Allies it wished to have. To fail to do so would have ignored the facts of interdependence among NATO allies in security as well as economic affairs.

Richard N. Gardner

Adrian Lyttelton replies:
Ambassador Gardner's letter raises some difficult questions. I agree that Berlinguer continued to insist that the PCI was part of the international Communist movement. As for his praise for the historic achievement of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, to deny that would have been political suicide. However, in his account of Berlinguer's intervention in the sixtieth anniversary celebrations in Moscow in 1977 Gardner mentions only those parts of Berlinguer's speech that reaffirmed his appreciation of the historic importance of the revolution. He ignores those passages in which Berlinguer insisted on the necessity for political democracy and liberty as the foundation for any socialist society. This is the most salient example of the omissions that make Gardner's account one-sided. It can be questioned whether such a position was consistent with a continued belief in "Marxism-Leninism"; certainly the Soviets did not think so.

Berlinguer's vision of foreign policy was undoubtedly not easily compatible with an orthodox view of American interests. However, I don't think that the participation of the PCI in the government majority represented only a danger for American interests. The PCI's public acceptance of NATO, at a time of severe internal crisis, was an important guarantee of Italy's stability as a member of the Western Alliance. Similarly, Gardner's alarm about Communist control of regional and city governments (p. 124) seems misplaced. Such responsibilities were in fact important in strengthening the trend within the PCI toward a pragmatic reformism.

Ambassador Gardner makes a good point when he writes "it was by no means certain that the DC decision to bring the PCI into the parliamentary majority was the last step in the PCI advance to power." Indeed the terms of Gardner's statement of January 12, 1978, which actually called for Communist influence to be "reduced" (p. 151), may well have had an important effect in blocking any such further advance. But was this entirely fortunate for Italy? The leader of the Republican Party, Ugo La Malfa, no friend of the Communists in the past, did not think so. One further step could have been taken without actually including members of the PCI in the government. This would have been the inclusion of non-party experts elected on the Communist list in Parliament as indipendenti di sinistra, as Andreotti suggested at the beginning of 1979. Would this have been a fatal step for Italian democracy or participation in the Alliance?

The question of "interference" is very difficult to adjudicate. One can accept that the US government had a legitimate right to make its views clearly known. But in the eyes of many Italians the timing and terms of the announcement, in the context of the US's economic and strategic superiority and prestige, did constitute an objective interference with the course of Italian politics.

Unfortunately, this question is not a thing of the past. The fact that, during the recent Italian election campaign, the State Department saw fit to issue a warning to US tourists traveling in Italy on March 21, and, in response to criticism, has issued a similar warning for France (where street violence has been far more serious) only five days later, is another depressing proof that the United States uses different criteria for the two nations. But, as I said in my review, the main responsibility for this must lie in the readiness of many Italians to invoke US intervention at the expense of their country's dignity and sovereignty.

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http://www.cfr.org/publication/9009/winning_the_cold_war_jimmy_carters_forgotten_role_rush_transcript_federal_news_service.html

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Sul sito in inglese del Partito comunista danese e norvegese c'è un elenco di covert action del governo americano. E'segnalata nel 1980( ma la data corretta delle elezioni in Italia è il 1979)una covert action in Italia per tenere fuori i comunisti dal governo italiano da parte degli americani e per aumentare la paura di Mosca in noi italiani. Per l'ennesima volta secondo questo sito nelle elezioni del 1979 si finanziarono i partiti anticomunisti e andò al Governo Cossiga. Non so se tali informazioni sono vere, so che leggendo i primi due documenti lo potrebbero essere. Questa covert action è costata all'Amministrazione Carter secondo questo sito dei comunisti norvegesi e danesi "tonnellate di denaro in contanti" . In questa covert action sempre secondo i comunisti danesi e norvegesi si utilizzò da parte del governo americano per raggiungere l'obiettivo anche il terrorismo(l'eliminazione di Moro?), oltre i finanziamenti ai partiti anticomunisti.

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Al Link:
http://www.covertactionquarterly.org/backissues.html#Anchor-Number-47857

nell'indice di questo numero si trova scritto:

Number 4 (1979) Spying on allies: Secret Italy cable(Spiare gli alleati: documento segreto sull'Italia); CIA in Spain; CIA Africa recruiting; Angola; Subversive academics in Southern Africa; CIA and human rights; CIA firearms authority; Intelligence budgets; In Search of Enemies.

Sulla copertina del numero si trova scritto:
"l'intelligence militare(ovviamente americana) infiltra l'Italia".

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Olof Palme, Swedish Prime Minister and leader of the Social Democratic Party, was assassinated in Stockholm on 28 February 1986. The investigation into the crime has proven to be extremely complex, producing dozens of suspects and traces during the years that have gone by. While substantial data to confirm this claim is lacking it shall be noted that Swedish journalists have also suspected the secret stay-behind armies of NATO of having been involved in the crime.

In 1992 the leading Swedish daily headlined: "A top-secret intelligence network within NATO is behind the death of Olof Palme." In the article journalist Göran Beckerus reported that "This has been leaked by several sources in Sweden and Germany." One of his sources was alleged CIA agent Oswald Le Winter, discredited in earlier years where he had deliberately mislead journalists. The other two sources, "both with secret services background", wished to remain unnamed but confirmed that a top-secret NATO office was behind the Palme murder. One of the sources was going as far as to claim "that he had been able to see and photograph the document according to which NATO was behind the assassination."

" The NATO organ allegedly linked to the assassination is SOPS, a part of ACC” journalist Beckerus reported in his article.” ACC is an organization within which the secret services of the NATO countries meet. ACC/SOPS, among other things, is the coordination organ for the stay-behind organizations in Europe. Such a secret Swedish resistance network under the command of Alvar Lindencrona has been discovered by Dagens Nyheter in 1990. SOPS is the operative branch of ACC. Its tasks are to plan and to hide secret operations. A third organ, called ITAC, is supporting SOPS with information and intelligence means. The delegates of ACC and SOPS met regularly every month in different European capitals. Headquarters allegedly are in Brussels, but the meetings took also place in Mons (Belgium), as well as cities in Denmark and Norway. Dagens Nyheter is in the possession of information, that also Sweden at times regularly participated in ACC/SOPS meetings. The representative of the former Social Democrat government has confirmed this information. Also a source within the Swedish military secret service has confirmed the existence and the activities of the ACC/SOPS.” International research into NATO’s stay-behind armies has confirmed both the existence of the ACC as well as the existence of the Swedish stay-behind army under Lindencrona. Yet journalist Beckerus is still the only named source who goes as far as to claim that the network was involved in the Palme assassination: “During several meetings of the ACC/SOPS allegedly an assassination plot was made ... code-named 'Operation Tree'. Dagens Nyheter is in possession of an alleged SOPS document which laconically states 'project management is local, technician imported.'" [71]

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2. Il documento Remondino.
Il 13 maggio 92 si presentava spontaneamente il giornalista Ennio
Remondino per consegnare un documento asseritamente proveniente da un
organismo di sicurezza, classificato “Restricted Circulation - Cosmic” con
la seguente composizione alfanumerica come elemento identificativo
“ACC/SOPS-NZ PP 116”.
Il giornalista riferiva di averlo ricevuto da un sedicente esponente
della CIA a Nymiga (rectius: Nimega) nei Paesi Bassi, di nome George
Mihara; nome sicuramente fittizio in quanto ad altri giornalisti costui si
sarebbe presentato con altri nomi. Remondino teneva a precisare che da
accertamenti svolti attraverso propri contatti con elementi dell’intelligence
italiana e straniera aveva ricevuto conferme di genuinità non tanto sui
contenuti quanto sulla forma del documento. Forniva anche una propria
interpretazione delle sigle di identificazione del documento: ACC avrebbe
dovuto stare per Allied Clandestine Committee; SOPS per Special
Operation Plenning Staff; NZ avrebbe dovuto essere una sezione del SOPS;
PP per Paper Position; D per 4° esemplare in uscita; il nr.98116 sarebbe
stata la data secondo l’ordine in uso nei Paesi anglosassoni, cioè mese,
anno, giorno; Rome sta per stazione di Roma. Il documento esibito,
continuava il giornalista, sarebbe stata una relazione di ventuno pagine dei
vertici Stay Behind, in cui sono elencati, in una sorta di sommario, quattro
punti affrontati nel corso dell’incontro (punti 19, 20, 21, 22), di cui nel
foglio esibito lo sviluppo del 21 intitolato “Switzerland” (v. esame
Remondino Ennio, GI 13.05.92).
I quattro punti citati nel documento concernono: 19) Stazione di
Roma ha dato assicurazione al Sops che il nuovo collegamento con Parigi,
Giovanni Senzani, si trova sotto contratto. 20) Andreotti ha dato
assicurazione al Sops che all’attività di Dalla Chiesa riguardo ad Ustica
verrà posto termine prima che la situazione diventi irreversibile. 21)
Finanziamento, attraverso canali svizzeri, del progettato piano di
Avanguardia, al livello dello scorso anno. 22) Roma dovrà dare
assicurazione a Parigi che non ci saranno ulteriori indagini sul conto di
Durand.
Le indagini sull’attendibilità del documento hanno consentito di
accertare, attraverso ricerche di archivio presso le competenti articolazioni
del S.I.S.MI, che non vi era alcuna traccia dell’esistenza di questo
documento, tanto da non essere in grado, quel Servizio, d’interloquire sulla
sua autenticità. La classifica dei documenti ACC era, di norma, “Cosmic
Top Segret”; la qualifica “Cosmic”, apposta isolatamente, non aveva
significato; la dicitura “Restricted Circulation Cosmic”, apposta sul
documento, non risultava usata in documenti noti al S.I.S.MI. il S.I.S.DE
comunicava, invece, che l’accertamento richiesto rientrava nelle
competenze dell’Ufficio Centrale per la Sicurezza (U.C.SI) ubicato presso
l’Ufficio Centrale Sicurezza. Avviava pertanto accertamenti ad ampio
raggio volti ad identificare la fonte del documento o di altri analoghi. In
esito informava che non v’era traccia alcuna in ambito NATO del
documento ACC/SOPS-N2 PP 116/D 98116 (v. rapporto Reparto
Operativo CC., 27.08.92).
Non si è trattato altro, se ne può concludere, che di un falso alquanto
marchiano, con l’intento di collegare la strage, inquinando questa inchiesta,
all’organizzazione di Stay Behind in Europa e di chiamare in causa anche
in questa vicenda il senatore Andreotti, con l’accusa di aver progettato di
soffocare iniziative di Dalla Chiesa su questo gravissimo delitto.

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Belgian stay-behind network
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
The Belgian stay-behind network, colloquially called "Gladio"[1], was a secret mixed civilian and military unit, trained to form a resistance movement in the event of an Soviet invasion and part of a network of similar organizations in NATO-countries. It functioned from at least 1951 until 1990, when the Belgian branch was promptly and officially dissolved after its existence became publicly known following revelations concerning the Italian branch of the stay-behind network.

Contents [hide]
1 History
2 Organization, activities and resources
3 Parliamentary inquiry
3.1 Overview
3.2 Problems
3.3 Handled material and major findings
3.4 Conclusions and impact
4 Gladio conspiracies
4.1 Assassination of Julien Lahaut
4.2 Attempted coup d'état
4.3 Nijvel gang violence, 1980s
4.4 Jean Thiriart's far-right Parti Communautaire Européen
5 1995: Le Soir controversy
6 BBET, 2006
7 See also
8 Further reading
9 References and footnotes

[edit] History
The documented history of the Belgian branch of the Gladio network starts in 1948 when Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak and Minister of Justice Paul Struye gave the Staatsveiligheid (State Security Service) permission to discuss with allied intelligence services the organization of a clandestine stay-behind network. These negotiations mainly happened with Sir Stewart Menzies of the British SIS and representatives of the then freshly founded CIA. The explicit objectives of this collaboration were outlined in a top-secret letter from Menzies to Spaak:

“ The present object of [Anglo-Belgian co-operation between the special services] should be directed to two main aims:
The improvement of our information on the subject of Cominform and potential enemy activities in so far as they concern our two countries.
The preparation of appropriate intelligence and action organizations in the event of war.
”
—Sir Stewart Menzies, January 27, 1949

The amount of influence at this early stage, accredited to the CIA varies from source to source. During the initial negotiations Menzies proposed to keep the US out of the organization, but Spaak objected a further developments occurred in a tripartite (Belgium–Great-Britain–United States) or multilateral setting. In the final report of the parliamentary inquiry there is little mention of CIA involvement, but investigative journalist Walter de Bock points, based on Pentagon documents

This article needs additional citations for verification.
Please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (January 2008)

, at the CIA's significant early organizational role and de facto control until 1968.[2] Similarly, Colonel Margot complains in an internal note, dated April 8, 1959, about the influence of the US intelligence services on the Belgian branch of the Gladio-network.[3]

These initial negotiations led to closer collaboration between the tree countries' secret services under the name Tripartite Meeting Belgium. Following this meeting, the Belgian stay-behind network became operational, but it was not until January 4, 1952 that the first formal instructions for stay-behind operations were issued to Ludovicus Caeymaex (Staatsveiligheid) and General Etienne Baele.[4]

Growing polarization between East and West and awareness of the need for continental collaboration led to the foundation in 1949 of the Comité Clandestin de l'Union Occidentale (C.C.U.O.), which contained Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Great-Britain.[5] The C.C.U.O. laid the base for the formation of the NATO and coordinated the various stay-behind networks in the five member countries.[6] Its functions were transferred to the Clandestine Planning Committee (C.P.C.), another NATO-organization in 1951, which was renamed in to Coordination and Planning Committee in 1959.[7] The C.P.C. elaborated a plan for installing two taskgroups, one for communications and one for secret networks, a structure reflected in the Allied Coordination Committee (A.C.C.) founded in 1958 to relieve the C.P.C. of some of its tasks.[8]

The A.C.C. consisted of the members of the C.C.U.O. plus the US and coordinated the stay-behind activities, as was stipulated on its first meeting in April 1959 under French supervision:

“ The A.C.C. is a six-power regional committee for providing mutual consultation and developing policy guidance on matters of common interest regarding stay behind matters in the Western European countries concerned.[9] [added emphasis] ”
—Declaration of principles, April 29-30, 1959

These interlocking coordination organizations, like the C.P.C. and A.C.C, were initially headquartered in Paris, but moved along with SHAPE, NATO's central headquarters, to Mons in Belgium after the French withdrawal from NATO's unified command structure in 1966. After the initial six counties, Germany, Italy, Denmark and Norway became members of the A.C.C.. Though all of the counties were members of NATO, an official link between the A.C.C and NATO was denied. The parliamentary committee noted "... one can not do away with the impression that in practice closer and closer relations did come to exist".[10]The following decades the stay-behind activities were mainly coordinated through A.C.C.-meetings. These activities consisted officially of (multinational) training activities like infiltration, parachute jumping and long range communications, of which numerous were held at least between 1972 and 1989.[11] Due to the secretive nature of the network, the milieu of various operatives involved and the Cold War setting, allegations were raised that the stay-behind network was during this time also at least indirect involved with clandestine actions on Belgian soil. The last documented meeting of the A.C.C took place on the 23th and 24th October 1990 under supervision of General Van Calster, where the participants discussed a.o. a scaling-back of the stay-behind network in light of changing international relations.[citation needed]

This was the meeting Andreotti was referring to following the October 24, 1990 revelation of the existence of Gladio in Italy, a revelations several others governments' spokespersons reacted to by claiming that any stay-behind in their own country was history. This only exasperated Andreotti, who declared to the press that the last stay-behind meeting had taken place in Belgium a few days ago. After the exposure of the Italian branch and inquiries by Italian officials to their Belgian counterparts, Defense minister Guy Coëme and Prime Minister Wilfried Martens made the existence of the Belgian section of the Gladio-network public in a press meeting on November 7, 1990.

The government decided on November 23 1990, a few days after the proposition for a parliamentary investigation to officially disband the network.

[edit] Organization, activities and resources
The Belgian Gladio-branch consisted of two separate sections:

S.D.R.A VIII (French: service de documentation, de renseignments et d'action VIII), residing under the military intelligence service, the Belgian General Information and Security Service (S.G.R) and thus the minister of Defense.
S.T.C/Mob.[12] (Dutch: Sectie training, communicatie en documentatie), residing under the Staatsveiligheid and thus the minister of Justice.
S.D.R.A VIII was one of the sections of S.D.R.A (military security service), which in its turn is part of the S.G.R. (general military intelligence and security service). The S.G.R's functions are formally described in a decree from 1989 and are twofold: intelligence gathering and ensuring the security of military personnel and installations, issuing clearances etc. The S.D.R.A is mandated with the second task, and is dived into functional sections: for instance, S.D.R.A III is contra-infiltration (for S.D.R.A XI, see further).

The members of S.D.R.A VIII were military personnel, trained in unorthodox warfare, combat and sabotage, parachute jumping and maritime operations. [13] The operatives were trained to accompany the government aboard in case of a Soviet invasion, and then establish liaisons with the Belgian resistance movement and engage in warfare.

Oversight...

In the course of the parliamentary investigation the committee stumbled by chance on the existence of the secretariat of the Coordination and Planning Committee, which formed S.D.R.A XI, but was funded though secret NATO-payments. When Paul Detrembleur, former head of the S.D.R.A and last administrator of S.D.R.A XI/C.P.C.-secretariat, was called to testify before the parliamentary inquiry about the activities of this section in relation to the Gladio-activities, he refused to divulge any information.[14][15]

The final parliamentary rapport stressed the thus resulting incomplete insight into the functioning of the C.P.C. and its relation to S.D.R.A. VIII, which formally organized the military section of the Gladio-network. The rapport noted that the C.P.C. was responsible for the relations between the Belgian secret services and the NATO high command (especially SHAPE), and that the witnesses denied being involved with stay-behind activities. The reason was, the later claimed, that that NATO was "forward defending"-oriented and thus not interested in stay-behind activities in countries like Belgium, which did not bordered Warsaw Pact-nations. The commission then further noted the discrepancy between these claims and given reason, and the fact that the C.P.C. co-coordinated the S.D.R.A. VIII and participated in the A.C.C.-meetings.[16]

S.T.C/Mob. function, oversight ...

The civilian branch of the Belgian stay-behind had the mission to collect intelligence under conditions of enemy occupation which could be useful to the government and to organize secure communication routes to evacuate the members of the government and other people with official functions.

This short section requires expansion.

Military trainers/operatives and civilian operatives.

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Recruitment (how, criteria)
Training activities (joint international training/war games, sabotage, intelligence ....)
Funding (equipment)
Weapons, weapons-depots.
Both military intelligence and Staatsveiligheid maintained dossiers on Gladio training activities, of which incomplete versions were made available to the parliamentary committee. Events from the list of operations by the military branch was provided by Coëme and is denoted by A, while events from the list from the archives of the Staatsveiligheid (titled "Overzicht oefeningen in het kader ACC – periode 1980-1990") is denoted by B:

(A) 1972: Training on clandestine techniques.
(A) 1976: Training on radio-communications, intelligence, maritime operations, aerial operations and escape routes.
(A) 1977: Training on optimizing techniques to locate downed pilots and the use of escape routes.
(A) 1978: In-door training on clandestine missions.
(A) 1980: Training on parachute-jumping, long distance radio communication and clandestine techniques.
(B) June 1980: OREGAN II
(A) 1981: Lessons and training on clandestine activities.
(A) 1983: Training on escape routes, intelligence, aerial operations and radio communications.
(A) 1985: Six trainings (at least two outside Belgium, one in Belgium): infiltration a parachute-jumping, extracting material through escape routes.
(A) 1986, 1987 & 1988: : Trainings outside Belgium on intelligence operations and radio communications.
Minister Melchior Wathelet testified before the parliamentary inquiry that secret weapon depots were created in the fifties, of which a first one was discovered in 1957 due to a landslide, and a second one in 1959 by playing children. He further stated that after these discoveries it was decided to abandon the depots and transfer the weapons to a military depot.[17] An inventory report, dated 1991, for the military section of Gladio mentions o.a. inflatable boats, video-equipment and around 300 weapons, a.o. M1 carbines, MP40 submachine guns and "armes en cocon", weapons packaged for longterm storage.[18]

[edit] Parliamentary inquiry

[edit] Overview
After the existence of the Belgian branch of the Gladio-network became public, speculations and allegations about involvement of the Gladio-operatives in various high-profile and often unsolved crimes and terroristic acts during the eighties began to appear in the media. To investigate these allegations and clarify the operation of the Belgian branch, a senatorial investigative commission was established on 20 December 1990. It was tasked with clarifying the structure, aims etc. of the network and the amount of oversight; which connections existed with domestic and foreign intelligence and police services; and whether there was a link with events previously examined in parliamentary inquiries[19] or certain serious crimes and terroristic acts committed the previous decade.[5]

Chairman senator Roger Lallemand ...

The commission convened from 16 January 1991 until 5 July 1991, during which fifty seven meetings were held and thirty seven witnesses were heard. Amongst those who testified before the commission were ministers Guy Coëme, Melchior Wathelet and Louis Tobback; former administrator-director-general of the Staatsveiligheid (77-90) and head of STC-MOB Albert Raes, Ludo Caeymaex (administrator-general Staatsveiligheid 58-77); then current administrator-general of the Staatsveiligheid Stéphane Schewebach, Jacques Devlieghere (Staatsveiligheid 78-89, nr. 2); S.D.R.A.-operative André Moyen; Gladio-instructors Guibert Nieweling (code name "Addie"), Michel Huys ("Alain"), Etienne Annarts ("Stéphane")

This short section requires expansion.

[edit] Problems
The two major obstacles facing the commission of inquiry were firstly the secret nature of the case and the related unwillingness of witnesses in disclosing information and secondly time constraints.

Firstly, due to the nature of the case, and the various legal, professional and military requirements of confidentiality, the commission went to great lengths in limiting public access to discussed material. For instance, the parliament did forgo an earlier proposition for a parliamentary in favor for the proposition by Lallemand which included the requirement that the commission operated behind closed doors (in contravention to the regular parliamentary inquiry procedures).[20] Lallemand placed also additional restriction on the ability to communicate with the press, handling of documents, etc. These restrictions were criticized both for being undemocratic, unnecessary or contra productive and for not being strict enough.[21]

The committee initially envisaged a solution whereby the names of the operatives were handed to three selected magistrates, familiar with the relevant unsolved criminal investigations. The relevant agencies and witnesses refused to do so, with the refusal varying from polite claims of forgetfulness or references to oaths of secrecy to outright hostility.[22] This issue was compounded by the fact that records on former operatives were systematically purged and the magistrates were not up to date with more recent investigations.[23] ?Names with the CIA/London? The final report then concluded that the cooperation from both the military and the Staatsveiligheid was generally satisfactory, but deplored the stubborn withholding of the names of civilian operatives.[24]

Secondly, the commission faced time-related problems. The time allotted to the commission was initially five months, a period which the final report deplored as "very little" and short in comparison to other inquiries. The Senate granted on July 12, 1991 a request for extra time, which enabled the committee to work for another three months. Unfortunately most of the allotted time fell during the parliamentary recess, which further frustrated the effort to fully pursue the intended lines of inquery.[25]

[edit] Handled material and major findings
Handled material: Westmooreland, John Wood/Rudy Daems, ...

This short section requires expansion.

[edit] Conclusions and impact
Conclusions: ...

Reactions & indirect effect inquiry: Comité-I. In 1995, the Belgian Chamber of Representatives organized a parliamentary inquiry into the effectiveness of the Belgian police and judiciary with regards to the Nijvel gang investigation. The conclusions of this inquiry, as well as the earlier Senate inquiry on SDRA8 and the Chamber inquiry on banditism, resulted in the preparation of new legislation governing the mission and methods of the Belgian State Security Service and Belgian General Information and Security Service, which was passed in 1998.

This short section requires expansion.

[edit] Gladio conspiracies

[edit] Assassination of Julien Lahaut
In 1950, the assassination of Julien Lahaut, chairman of the Communist Party of Belgium (PCB) had doubtless both a national and international signification, in which Gladio's influence has been suspected. [26] Repeated requests have been made in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives for an investigation into Lahaut's death. Only recently it has became known that François Goossens, a Leopoldist, was his killer.

[edit] Attempted coup d'état
A September 10, 1973 note from the Belgian Brigade de Surveillance et de Renseignement intelligence agency described the organization of a coup d'état by certain "financial networks and far-right organizations", naming among others Emile Lecerf, boss of the Nouvelle Europe magazine (NEM) and political godfather of Francis Dossogne (future leader of far-right Front de la Jeunesse - FJ) and Paul Latinus, founder of the Westland New Post extremist group, in which Gladio's influence has been suspected, although ultimately never proved in justice. Paul Latinus would escape to Pinochet's Chile for a few months in 1981, before committing suicide in 1984. On the other hand, Emile Lecerf was also a member of the Jeune Europe far-right group [27].

[edit] Nijvel gang violence, 1980s
Main article: Nijvel gang
The violence of the Nijvel gang was linked in 1985 by the press to a conspiracy among the Belgian stay-behind SDRA8, the Belgian Gendarmerie SDRA6, the Belgian neo-Nazi group Westland New Post, and the Pentagon secret service Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). However, after a parliamentary inquiry, no hard proof substaining these claims was found, and investigations into the Nijvel gang continue to this day. However, the mystery of how those cold-blooded massacres were committed did convince the Belgian Parliament to create a Permanent Committee of Surveillance of Intelligence Agencies' activities [28].

[edit] Jean Thiriart's far-right Parti Communautaire Européen
According to Amnistia.net, Luc Jouret, founder of the Order of the Solar Temple with Joseph di Mambro, had helped far-right activist Jean Thiriart organize a split in the Communist Party of Belgium (PCB) in the 1970s, creating the "Parti Communautaire Européen, a "Nazi-Maoist" party which succeeded to the Jeune Europe far-right group. According to Bruno Fouchereau, author of La mafia des sectes and collaborator of Le Monde Diplomatique, quoted by Amnistia, this Belgium "Nazi-Maoist group" was in fact controlled by the SDRA-8, Belgium's branch of Gladio. SDRA-8 other's creation was the Westland New Post group.[29]

[edit] 1995: Le Soir controversy
In 1996, Le Soir newspaper caused a public uproar by revealing the existence of a classified document, dated August 1995, and titled "Plan de base de la défense militaire du territoire" ("Base plan of the military defense of the territory"). The newspaper quoted some passages of what it called a "racist plan": "Many communities of immigrants have settled themselves in large agglomerations. If these population groups should reach a position of strong disagreement with Belgian politics, they could launch actions destined to counteract these policies or to make their concerns known [...] We consider that there exists no open threat in Belgium [...] But there is a clandestine threat with a permanent character" (French: "Nombre de communautés immigrées se sont fixées dans les grandes agglomérations. Si ces groupes de population devaient entrer clairement en désaccord avec la politique belge, ils pourraient déclencher des actions visant à contrarier cette politique ou visant à faire connaître leur mécontentements (...) Nous considérons qu'il n'existe aucune menace ouverte en Belgique (...) Mais il existe bien une menace clandestine avec un caractère permanent" - sic).

The dissolved SDRA-8 had been replaced by the "Commandement territorial interforces" (CTI), a military intelligence agency organized by provinces and essentially composed of about a thousand reserve officers. Its goal was to infiltrate civil society and find informants, with the mission to be especially concerned by the "immigrant communities which represented a permanent clandestine threat". According to Le Soir, if the CTI is not closely linked to the military agency Service Général du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (SGRS), then it is "nothing else than a new structure of military intelligence... particularly suspicious of anything that is foreign to it".[30][31] Defense minister Poncelet replied in the Belgian Senate that the plan was only an internal draft proposal, which was never approved by the military command or the defense minister himself.[32]

Finally, the activities of the Belgian military intelligence agencies prompted the Parliamentary Committee of Surveillance (Comité R) to investigate various abusive wiretappings. "The central documentation of the SGR is composed of 450 000 files", stated Le Soir.[30]

[edit] BBET, 2006
The police arrest of members of far-right group Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw in September 2006 made the Belgian press recall the "Bloody Eighties", during which the Brabant massacres were carried out (28 deaths), and the Marxist organization Communist Combatant Cells carried out terrorist attacks (2 deaths).[33]. According to Justice Minister Laurette Onkelinx and Interior Minister Patrick Dewael, the suspects (11 of whom were members of the military) were preparing terrorist attacks in order to "destabilize" Belgium.[34][35]

[edit] See also
Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw
Brabant massacres
Gladio
Jeune Europe
Westland New Post

[edit] Further reading
Colby, William (1978). Honorable men : my life in the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster. ISBN 06-7122-875-7.
Ganser, Daniele (2005). NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe. New York: Frank Cass. ISBN 0-7146-8500-3.
Gijsels, Hugo (1991). Netwerk Gladio. Leuven: Uitgeverij Kritak. ISBN 90-6303-386-9. (Dutch)
Willems, Jan (1991). Gladio. Brussels: EPO. ISBN 2-87262-051-6. (French)

[edit] References and footnotes
^ (Explain "gladio")
^ 11/12/13-06-1991, De Morgen
^ Gijsels, Hugo (1991). Netwerk Gladio. Leuven: Uitgeverij Kritak, 80. ISBN 90-6303-386-9.
^ Gijsels (1991), p. 69.
^ a b Parlementaire Commissie (1991). "Verslag van het parlementair onderzoek met betrekking tot het bestaan in België van een clandestien internationaal inlichtingennetwerk" (pdf). Belgian Senate. Retrieved on 2007-08-01. (French)(Dutch)
^ Gijsels, pg. 68
^ Parlementaire Commissie (1991), p. 20.
^ Parlementaire Commissie (1991), p. 20.
^ Parlementaire Commissie (1991), p. 20.
^ Parlementaire Commissie (1991), p. 21
^ Gijsels (1991), pg. 71
^ S.T.C/Mob. was renamed on November 1, 1990 to D.15, but most sources keep referring to its old name.
^ Ganser...
^ Parlementaire Commissie (1991), p. 22.
^ Gijsels (1991), pp. 69-70
^ Parlementaire Commissie (1991), p. 23.
^ Gijsels (1991), pg. 71
^ Gijsels (1991), pg. 89
^ More specifically the parliamentary inquiry concerning militia-activity (1980) and combatting serious crime and terrorism (1988), (more).
^ Gijsels (1991), p. 33.
^ By journalists, senatretc. PRL Raes...
^ Ex, ex., radio Brussel...
^ Gijsels noted that order...
^ Parlementaire Commissie (1991), p. ?
^ For instance, the commission had planned to interview several investigative journalists, people like Richard Brenneke and had requested several "dossiers chauds" (English: "hot cases") like ...
^ Hans Depraetere and Jenny Dierickx, "La Guerre froide en Belgique" ("Cold War in Belgium") (EPO-Dossier, Anvers, 1986) (French)
^ Résistances.be [1]
^ Permanent Committee for the Control of Intelligence Agencies (Belgium) See in particular the "history" section in the "Presentation" part.
^ Amnistia info on the Order of the Solar Temple and links with Gladio
^ a b "L'Armée craint une menace immigrée - L'armée tisse un nouveau réseau d'espions - La justice et le Comité R enquêtent", Le Soir, July 30, 1996. Retrieved on February 2006. (French)
^ LE DERAPAGE RACISTE A L'ARMEE LE MONDE POLITIQUE ET SOCIAL SOUS LE CHOC, Le Soir, August 1, 1996 (French); UN CONCEPT RACISTE POUR LA DEFENSE MILITAIRE DU TERRITOIRE L'ARMEE FAIT -PARTIELLEMENT- AMENDE HONORABLE, Le Soir, July 31, 1996 (French)
^ Question Period Bulletin no. 1-28 Belgian Senate, September 24, 1996
^ Un arrière-goût d'années de plomb, La Libre Belgique, 8 September 2006 (French)
^ De nouvelles découvertes, La Libre Belgique, 8 September 2006 (French)
^ Mandats d'arrêts confirmés pour les néo-nazis, Le Soir, 13 September 2006 (French)
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